主 题:Board interlock and contagion effect of financial misreporting: evidence from bank loans
内容简介: examines the contagion effect of financial misreporting through shared directors from the perspective of creditors in the US. We find that for a firm interlocked with a misreporting firm, loans initiated after the restatement have significantly higher spreads, more covenant restrictions, fewer lenders in a syndicate and higher likelihood of being secured. In the cross section, the increase in loan spreads is significantly higher when the interlocking directors are more responsible for the misreporting, when the restatement is more severe, when the board of the interlocked firms is less independent, and when the interlocked firms and banks have greater information asymmetry. Overall, our results confirm the contagion effect from creditors’ perspective that because misreporting increases lenders’ concern that interlocked firms may have poor board monitoring and have also engaged in misreporting, lenders price the increased information risk and monitoring cost by requiring a higher interest rate.
报告人:袁涛 博士
时 间:2019-01-17 14:00
地 点:竞慧东楼307
举办单位:会计学院 银行与货币研究院
