主 题:“中庸”悖论
内容简介:运用声誉信号模型来分析领导的选拔问题。我们考虑一个拥有两层架构的简化企业，企业中有一个领导和一个管理者。管理者向领导提议有风险的创新项目，并可以选择进行前期投入来提高此项目的价值。领导决定是否采用此项目。领导的能力为私人信息，市场根据领导的决策和结果来更新对领导能力的判断。在均衡中，领导对名誉的考虑可能引起过度保守。本文有两个主要结论：尽管对名誉的考虑会带来某种扭曲，然而这种考量可能会给企业带来好处，原因在于它会激励管理者努力投入来提高项目价值；其次，市场对于领导能力的预判和企业绩效之间存在一个非单调的关系。这意味着可能存在中庸的悖论：企业有可能从任用一个“看上去”中庸的领导中获益。
We consider a two-agent hierarchical organization with a leader and a manager in a reputation-signaling model. The manager proposes an innovative but risky project to the leader, and decides whether to exert an effort to improve the value of the project, which benets the organization. The leader decides whether to endorse the project or block it. The leader's competence is her private information, and the market updates its belief about the leader's type based on observation of her action (endorsing the project or blocking it) and its outcome. In equilibrium, the leader could behave excessively conservatively when she is subject to reputation concerns. We have two main findings. First, aside from its usual distortionary effects, the leader's reputation concern has a beneficial effect by inducing the manager to supply productive effort and improves the organization's performance. Second, there exists a nonmonotonic relationship between the perceived competence of the leader and the performance of the organization. As a result, a paradox of mediocracy emerges: The organization may benet from a seemingly mediocre leader, as a mediocre leader motivates the manager to exert eort, which osets the eciency loss due to incorrect decisions.
报告人:乔雪 副教授
时 间:2019-03-20 15:30
地 点:位育楼117
举办单位:城市发展研究院 科研部
